KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix handling of secondary HPTEG in HPT resizing code

This fixes the computation of the HPTE index to use when the HPT
resizing code encounters a bolted HPTE which is stored in its
secondary HPTE group.  The code inverts the HPTE group number, which
is correct, but doesn't then mask it with new_hash_mask.  As a result,
new_pteg will be effectively negative, resulting in new_hptep
pointing before the new HPT, which will corrupt memory.

In addition, this removes two BUG_ON statements.  The condition that
the BUG_ONs were testing -- that we have computed the hash value
incorrectly -- has never been observed in testing, and if it did
occur, would only affect the guest, not the host.  Given that
BUG_ON should only be used in conditions where the kernel (i.e.
the host kernel, in this case) can't possibly continue execution,
it is not appropriate here.

Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
index 966097232d2147bbcd79df41354a5f973fb9b7c1..d19649960bbf926deea36c6ea59b08ef94002b9b 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
@@ -1329,12 +1329,8 @@ static unsigned long resize_hpt_rehash_hpte(struct kvm_resize_hpt *resize,
        }
 
        new_pteg = hash & new_hash_mask;
-       if (vpte & HPTE_V_SECONDARY) {
-               BUG_ON(~pteg != (hash & old_hash_mask));
-               new_pteg = ~new_pteg;
-       } else {
-               BUG_ON(pteg != (hash & old_hash_mask));
-       }
+       if (vpte & HPTE_V_SECONDARY)
+               new_pteg = ~hash & new_hash_mask;
 
        new_idx = new_pteg * HPTES_PER_GROUP + (idx % HPTES_PER_GROUP);
        new_hptep = (__be64 *)(new->virt + (new_idx << 4));