aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
return -EACCES;
- /* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
+ /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */
aux->alu_state = alu_state;
aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
return 0;
return err;
}
-/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions
- * and inline eligible helpers as explicit sequence of BPF instructions
- *
- * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
+/* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass.
+ * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations.
*/
-static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
bool expect_blinding = bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(prog);
int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
+ /* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */
if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) ||
insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
continue;
}
+ /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD &&
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS ||
BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) {
continue;
}
+ /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */
if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) ||
insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) {
const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X;
goto patch_call_imm;
}
+ /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */
if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) {
struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = {
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
if (ret == 0)
- ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
+ ret = do_misc_fixups(env);
/* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched
* insns could be handled correctly.