--- /dev/null
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * (C) Copyright 2018 Arm Ltd.
+ * (C) Copyright 2020-2021 Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org>
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <image.h>
+#include <sunxi_image.h>
+
+#include "imagetool.h"
+#include "mkimage.h"
+
+/*
+ * NAND requires 8K padding. For other devices, BROM requires only
+ * 512B padding, but let's use the larger padding to cover everything.
+ */
+#define PAD_SIZE 8192
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "mkimage (TOC0): %s: " fmt
+#define pr_err(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "error", ##args)
+#define pr_warn(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "warning", ##args)
+#define pr_info(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "info", ##args)
+
+struct __packed toc0_key_item {
+ __le32 vendor_id;
+ __le32 key0_n_len;
+ __le32 key0_e_len;
+ __le32 key1_n_len;
+ __le32 key1_e_len;
+ __le32 sig_len;
+ uint8_t key0[512];
+ uint8_t key1[512];
+ uint8_t reserved[32];
+ uint8_t sig[256];
+};
+
+/*
+ * This looks somewhat like an X.509 certificate, but it is not valid BER.
+ *
+ * Some differences:
+ * - Some X.509 certificate fields are missing or rearranged.
+ * - Some sequences have the wrong tag.
+ * - Zero-length sequences are accepted.
+ * - Large strings and integers must be an even number of bytes long.
+ * - Positive integers are not zero-extended to maintain their sign.
+ *
+ * See https://linux-sunxi.org/TOC0 for more information.
+ */
+struct __packed toc0_small_tag {
+ uint8_t tag;
+ uint8_t length;
+};
+
+typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_int;
+typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_oct;
+typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_seq;
+typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_exp;
+
+#define TOC0_SMALL_INT(len) { 0x02, (len) }
+#define TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(len) { 0x30, (len) }
+#define TOC0_SMALL_EXP(tag, len) { 0xa0 | (tag), len }
+
+struct __packed toc0_large_tag {
+ uint8_t tag;
+ uint8_t prefix;
+ uint8_t length_hi;
+ uint8_t length_lo;
+};
+
+typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_int;
+typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_bit;
+typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_seq;
+
+#define TOC0_LARGE_INT(len) { 0x02, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff }
+#define TOC0_LARGE_BIT(len) { 0x03, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff }
+#define TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(len) { 0x30, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff }
+
+struct __packed toc0_cert_item {
+ toc0_large_seq tag_totalSequence;
+ struct __packed toc0_totalSequence {
+ toc0_large_seq tag_mainSequence;
+ struct __packed toc0_mainSequence {
+ toc0_small_exp tag_explicit0;
+ struct __packed toc0_explicit0 {
+ toc0_small_int tag_version;
+ uint8_t version;
+ } explicit0;
+ toc0_small_int tag_serialNumber;
+ uint8_t serialNumber;
+ toc0_small_seq tag_signature;
+ toc0_small_seq tag_issuer;
+ toc0_small_seq tag_validity;
+ toc0_small_seq tag_subject;
+ toc0_large_seq tag_subjectPublicKeyInfo;
+ struct __packed toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo {
+ toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm;
+ toc0_large_seq tag_publicKey;
+ struct __packed toc0_publicKey {
+ toc0_large_int tag_n;
+ uint8_t n[256];
+ toc0_small_int tag_e;
+ uint8_t e[3];
+ } publicKey;
+ } subjectPublicKeyInfo;
+ toc0_small_exp tag_explicit3;
+ struct __packed toc0_explicit3 {
+ toc0_small_seq tag_extension;
+ struct __packed toc0_extension {
+ toc0_small_int tag_digest;
+ uint8_t digest[32];
+ } extension;
+ } explicit3;
+ } mainSequence;
+ toc0_large_bit tag_sigSequence;
+ struct __packed toc0_sigSequence {
+ toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm;
+ toc0_large_bit tag_signature;
+ uint8_t signature[256];
+ } sigSequence;
+ } totalSequence;
+};
+
+#define sizeof_field(TYPE, MEMBER) sizeof((((TYPE *)0)->MEMBER))
+
+static const struct toc0_cert_item cert_item_template = {
+ TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_totalSequence)),
+ {
+ TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_EXP(0, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit0)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_explicit0, version)),
+ 0,
+ },
+ TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_mainSequence, serialNumber)),
+ 0,
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_publicKey)),
+ {
+ TOC0_LARGE_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_publicKey, n)),
+ {},
+ TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_publicKey, e)),
+ {},
+ },
+ },
+ TOC0_SMALL_EXP(3, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit3)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_extension)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_extension, digest)),
+ {},
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof(struct toc0_sigSequence)),
+ {
+ TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0),
+ TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_sigSequence, signature)),
+ {},
+ },
+ },
+};
+
+#define TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS 3
+#define TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN \
+ ALIGN( \
+ sizeof(struct toc0_main_info) + \
+ sizeof(struct toc0_item_info) * TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS + \
+ sizeof(struct toc0_cert_item) + \
+ sizeof(struct toc0_key_item), \
+ 32)
+
+static char *fw_key_file = "fw_key.pem";
+static char *key_item_file = "key_item.bin";
+static char *root_key_file = "root_key.pem";
+
+/*
+ * Create a key item in @buf, containing the public keys @root_key and @fw_key,
+ * and signed by the RSA key @root_key.
+ */
+static int toc0_create_key_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len,
+ RSA *root_key, RSA *fw_key)
+{
+ struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf;
+ uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ unsigned int sig_len;
+ int n_len, e_len;
+
+ /* Store key 0. */
+ n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(root_key), key_item->key0);
+ e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(root_key), key_item->key0 + n_len);
+ if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) {
+ pr_err("Root key is too big for key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ key_item->key0_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len);
+ key_item->key0_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len);
+
+ /* Store key 1. */
+ n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), key_item->key1);
+ e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), key_item->key1 + n_len);
+ if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) {
+ pr_err("Firmware key is too big for key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ key_item->key1_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len);
+ key_item->key1_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len);
+
+ /* Sign the key item. */
+ key_item->sig_len = cpu_to_le32(RSA_size(root_key));
+ SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest);
+ if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest),
+ key_item->sig, &sig_len, root_key)) {
+ pr_err("Failed to sign key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (sig_len != sizeof(key_item->sig)) {
+ pr_err("Bad key item signature length\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *len = sizeof(*key_item);
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the key item in @buf, containing two public keys @key0 and @key1,
+ * and signed by the RSA key @key0. If @root_key is provided, only signatures
+ * by that key will be accepted. @key1 is returned in @key.
+ */
+static int toc0_verify_key_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len,
+ RSA *root_key, RSA **fw_key)
+{
+ struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf;
+ uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ int n_len, e_len;
+ RSA *key0 = NULL;
+ RSA *key1 = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *n, *e;
+
+ if (len < sizeof(*key_item))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Load key 0. */
+ n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_n_len);
+ e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_e_len);
+ if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) {
+ pr_err("Bad root key size in key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0, n_len, NULL);
+ e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0 + n_len, e_len, NULL);
+ key0 = RSA_new();
+ if (!key0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(key0, n, e, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* If a root key was provided, compare it to key 0. */
+ if (root_key && (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(root_key)) ||
+ BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(root_key)))) {
+ pr_err("Wrong root key in key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify the key item signature. */
+ SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest);
+ if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest),
+ key_item->sig, le32_to_cpu(key_item->sig_len), key0)) {
+ pr_err("Bad key item signature\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (fw_key) {
+ /* Load key 1. */
+ n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_n_len);
+ e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_e_len);
+ if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) {
+ pr_err("Bad firmware key size in key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1, n_len, NULL);
+ e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1 + n_len, e_len, NULL);
+ key1 = RSA_new();
+ if (!key1)
+ goto err;
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(key1, n, e, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (*fw_key) {
+ /* If a FW key was provided, compare it to key 1. */
+ if (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(*fw_key)) ||
+ BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(*fw_key))) {
+ pr_err("Wrong firmware key in key item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, send key1 back to the caller. */
+ *fw_key = key1;
+ key1 = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ RSA_free(key0);
+ RSA_free(key1);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest
+ * @digest, and signed by the RSA key @fw_key.
+ */
+static int toc0_create_cert_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len, RSA *fw_key,
+ uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH])
+{
+ struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (void *)buf;
+ uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence;
+ struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence;
+ struct toc0_extension *extension;
+ struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey;
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ unsigned int sig_len;
+
+ memcpy(cert_item, &cert_item_template, sizeof(*cert_item));
+ *len = sizeof(*cert_item);
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the public key.
+ *
+ * Only 2048-bit RSA keys are supported. Since this uses a fixed-size
+ * structure, it may fail for non-standard exponents.
+ */
+ totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence;
+ publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey;
+ if (BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), publicKey->n, sizeof(publicKey->n)) < 0 ||
+ BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), publicKey->e, sizeof(publicKey->e)) < 0) {
+ pr_err("Firmware key is too big for certificate\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fill in the firmware digest. */
+ extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension;
+ memcpy(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+ /*
+ * Sign the certificate.
+ *
+ * In older SBROM versions (and by default in newer versions),
+ * the last 4 bytes of the certificate are not signed.
+ *
+ * (The buffer passed to SHA256 starts at tag_mainSequence, but
+ * the buffer size does not include the length of that tag.)
+ */
+ SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), cert_digest);
+ sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence;
+ if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sigSequence->signature, &sig_len, fw_key)) {
+ pr_err("Failed to sign certificate\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (sig_len != sizeof(sigSequence->signature)) {
+ pr_err("Bad certificate signature length\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest
+ * @digest, and signed by the RSA key contained within. If @fw_key is provided,
+ * only that key will be accepted.
+ *
+ * This function is only expected to work with images created by mkimage.
+ */
+static int toc0_verify_cert_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *fw_key,
+ uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH])
+{
+ const struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (const void *)buf;
+ uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ const struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence;
+ const struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence;
+ const struct toc0_extension *extension;
+ const struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey;
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ RSA *key = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *n, *e;
+
+ /* Extract the public key from the certificate. */
+ totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence;
+ publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey;
+ n = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->n, sizeof(publicKey->n), NULL);
+ e = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->e, sizeof(publicKey->e), NULL);
+ key = RSA_new();
+ if (!key)
+ goto err;
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(key, n, e, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* If a key was provided, compare it to the embedded key. */
+ if (fw_key && (BN_cmp(RSA_get0_n(key), RSA_get0_n(fw_key)) ||
+ BN_cmp(RSA_get0_e(key), RSA_get0_e(fw_key)))) {
+ pr_err("Wrong firmware key in certificate\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If a digest was provided, compare it to the embedded digest. */
+ extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension;
+ if (digest && memcmp(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
+ pr_err("Wrong firmware digest in certificate\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify the certificate's signature. See the comment above. */
+ SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), cert_digest);
+ sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence;
+ if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sigSequence->signature,
+ sizeof(sigSequence->signature), key)) {
+ pr_err("Bad certificate signature\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ RSA_free(key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Always create a TOC0 containing 3 items. The extra item will be ignored on
+ * SoCs which do not support it.
+ */
+static int toc0_create(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key, RSA *fw_key,
+ uint8_t *key_item, uint32_t key_item_len,
+ uint8_t *fw_item, uint32_t fw_item_len, uint32_t fw_addr)
+{
+ struct toc0_main_info *main_info = (void *)buf;
+ struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1);
+ uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf;
+ RSA *orig_fw_key = fw_key;
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ uint32_t checksum = 0;
+ uint32_t item_offset;
+ uint32_t item_length;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Hash the firmware for inclusion in the certificate. */
+ SHA256(fw_item, fw_item_len, digest);
+
+ /* Create the main TOC0 header, containing three items. */
+ memcpy(main_info->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main_info->name));
+ main_info->magic = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC);
+ main_info->checksum = cpu_to_le32(BROM_STAMP_VALUE);
+ main_info->num_items = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS);
+ memcpy(main_info->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main_info->end));
+
+ /* The first item links the ROTPK to the signing key. */
+ item_offset = sizeof(*main_info) +
+ sizeof(*item_info) * TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS;
+ /* Using an existing key item avoids needing the root private key. */
+ if (key_item) {
+ item_length = sizeof(*key_item);
+ if (toc0_verify_key_item(key_item, item_length,
+ root_key, &fw_key))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(buf + item_offset, key_item, item_length);
+ } else if (toc0_create_key_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length,
+ root_key, fw_key)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY);
+ item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset);
+ item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length);
+ memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end));
+
+ /* The second item contains a certificate signed by the firmware key. */
+ item_offset = item_offset + item_length;
+ if (toc0_create_cert_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length,
+ fw_key, digest))
+ goto err;
+
+ item_info++;
+ item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT);
+ item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset);
+ item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length);
+ memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end));
+
+ /* The third item contains the actual boot code. */
+ item_offset = ALIGN(item_offset + item_length, 32);
+ item_length = fw_item_len;
+ if (buf + item_offset != fw_item)
+ memmove(buf + item_offset, fw_item, item_length);
+
+ item_info++;
+ item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE);
+ item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset);
+ item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length);
+ item_info->load_addr = cpu_to_le32(fw_addr);
+ memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end));
+
+ /* Pad to the required block size with 0xff to be flash-friendly. */
+ item_offset = item_offset + item_length;
+ item_length = ALIGN(item_offset, PAD_SIZE) - item_offset;
+ memset(buf + item_offset, 0xff, item_length);
+
+ /* Fill in the total padded file length. */
+ item_offset = item_offset + item_length;
+ main_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_offset);
+
+ /* Verify enough space was provided when creating the image. */
+ assert(len >= item_offset);
+
+ /* Calculate the checksum. Yes, it's that simple. */
+ for (i = 0; i < item_offset / 4; ++i)
+ checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+ main_info->checksum = cpu_to_le32(checksum);
+
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ if (fw_key != orig_fw_key)
+ RSA_free(fw_key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct toc0_item_info *
+toc0_find_item(const struct toc0_main_info *main_info, uint32_t name,
+ uint32_t *offset, uint32_t *length)
+{
+ const struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1);
+ uint32_t item_offset, item_length;
+ uint32_t num_items, main_length;
+ int i;
+
+ num_items = le32_to_cpu(main_info->num_items);
+ main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item_info) {
+ if (le32_to_cpu(item_info->name) != name)
+ continue;
+
+ item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item_info->offset);
+ item_length = le32_to_cpu(item_info->length);
+
+ if (item_offset > main_length ||
+ item_length > main_length - item_offset)
+ continue;
+
+ *offset = item_offset;
+ *length = item_length;
+
+ return item_info;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int toc0_verify(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key)
+{
+ const struct toc0_main_info *main_info = (void *)buf;
+ const struct toc0_item_info *item_info;
+ uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint32_t main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length);
+ uint32_t checksum = BROM_STAMP_VALUE;
+ uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf;
+ uint32_t length, offset;
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ RSA *fw_key = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ if (len < main_length)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Verify the main header. */
+ if (memcmp(main_info->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main_info->name)))
+ goto err;
+ if (le32_to_cpu(main_info->magic) != TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC)
+ goto err;
+ /* Verify the checksum without modifying the buffer. */
+ for (i = 0; i < main_length / 4; ++i)
+ checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+ if (checksum != 2 * le32_to_cpu(main_info->checksum))
+ goto err;
+ /* The length must be at least 512 byte aligned. */
+ if (main_length % 512)
+ goto err;
+ if (memcmp(main_info->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main_info->end)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Verify the key item if present (it is optional). */
+ item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY,
+ &offset, &length);
+ if (!item_info)
+ fw_key = root_key;
+ else if (toc0_verify_key_item(buf + offset, length, root_key, &fw_key))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Hash the firmware to compare with the certificate. */
+ item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE,
+ &offset, &length);
+ if (!item_info) {
+ pr_err("Missing firmware item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SHA256(buf + offset, length, digest);
+
+ /* Verify the certificate item. */
+ item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT,
+ &offset, &length);
+ if (!item_info) {
+ pr_err("Missing certificate item\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (toc0_verify_cert_item(buf + offset, length, fw_key, digest))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ if (fw_key != root_key)
+ RSA_free(fw_key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int toc0_check_params(struct image_tool_params *params)
+{
+ if (!params->dflag)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * If a key directory was provided, look for key files there.
+ * Otherwise, look for them in the current directory. The key files are
+ * the "quoted" terms in the description below.
+ *
+ * A summary of the chain of trust on most SoCs:
+ * 1) eFuse contains a SHA256 digest of the public "root key".
+ * 2) Private "root key" signs the certificate item (generated here).
+ * 3) Certificate item contains a SHA256 digest of the firmware item.
+ *
+ * A summary of the chain of trust on the H6 (by default; a bit in the
+ * BROM_CONFIG eFuse makes it work like above):
+ * 1) eFuse contains a SHA256 digest of the public "root key".
+ * 2) Private "root key" signs the "key item" (generated here).
+ * 3) "Key item" contains the public "root key" and public "fw key".
+ * 4) Private "fw key" signs the certificate item (generated here).
+ * 5) Certificate item contains a SHA256 digest of the firmware item.
+ *
+ * This means there are three valid ways to generate a TOC0:
+ * 1) Provide the private "root key" only. This works everywhere.
+ * For H6, the "root key" will also be used as the "fw key".
+ * 2) FOR H6 ONLY: Provide the private "root key" and a separate
+ * private "fw key".
+ * 3) FOR H6 ONLY: Provide the private "fw key" and a pre-existing
+ * "key item" containing the corresponding public "fw key".
+ * In this case, the private "root key" can be kept offline. The
+ * "key item" can be extracted from a TOC0 image generated using
+ * method #2 above.
+ *
+ * Note that until the ROTPK_HASH eFuse is programmed, any "root key"
+ * will be accepted by the BROM.
+ */
+ if (params->keydir) {
+ if (asprintf(&fw_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, fw_key_file) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (asprintf(&key_item_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, key_item_file) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (asprintf(&root_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, root_key_file) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int toc0_verify_header(unsigned char *buf, int image_size,
+ struct image_tool_params *params)
+{
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ RSA *root_key = NULL;
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ /* A root public key is optional. */
+ fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb");
+ if (fp) {
+ pr_info("Verifying image with existing root key\n");
+ root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!root_key)
+ root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ fclose(fp);
+ if (!root_key) {
+ pr_err("Failed to read public key from '%s'\n",
+ root_key_file);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = toc0_verify(buf, image_size, root_key);
+
+err:
+ RSA_free(root_key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const char *toc0_item_name(uint32_t name)
+{
+ if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT)
+ return "Certificate";
+ if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE)
+ return "Firmware";
+ if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY)
+ return "Key";
+ return "(unknown)";
+}
+
+static void toc0_print_header(const void *buf)
+{
+ const struct toc0_main_info *main_info = buf;
+ const struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1);
+ uint32_t head_length, main_length, num_items;
+ uint32_t item_offset, item_length, item_name;
+ int load_addr = -1;
+ int i;
+
+ num_items = le32_to_cpu(main_info->num_items);
+ head_length = sizeof(*main_info) + num_items * sizeof(*item_info);
+ main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length);
+
+ printf("Allwinner TOC0 Image\n"
+ "Size: %d bytes\n"
+ "Contents: %d items\n"
+ " 00000000:%08x Headers\n",
+ main_length, num_items, head_length);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item_info) {
+ item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item_info->offset);
+ item_length = le32_to_cpu(item_info->length);
+ item_name = le32_to_cpu(item_info->name);
+
+ if (item_name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE)
+ load_addr = le32_to_cpu(item_info->load_addr);
+
+ printf(" %08x:%08x %s\n",
+ item_offset, item_length,
+ toc0_item_name(item_name));
+ }
+
+ if (num_items && item_offset + item_length < main_length) {
+ item_offset = item_offset + item_length;
+ item_length = main_length - item_offset;
+
+ printf(" %08x:%08x Padding\n",
+ item_offset, item_length);
+ }
+
+ if (load_addr != -1)
+ printf("Load address: 0x%08x\n", load_addr);
+}
+
+static void toc0_set_header(void *buf, struct stat *sbuf, int ifd,
+ struct image_tool_params *params)
+{
+ uint32_t key_item_len = 0;
+ uint8_t *key_item = NULL;
+ int ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ RSA *root_key = NULL;
+ RSA *fw_key = NULL;
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ /* Either a key item or the root private key is required. */
+ fp = fopen(key_item_file, "rb");
+ if (fp) {
+ pr_info("Creating image using existing key item\n");
+ key_item_len = sizeof(struct toc0_key_item);
+ key_item = OPENSSL_malloc(key_item_len);
+ if (!key_item || fread(key_item, key_item_len, 1, fp) != 1) {
+ pr_err("Failed to read key item from '%s'\n",
+ root_key_file);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
+ }
+
+ fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb");
+ if (fp) {
+ root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!root_key)
+ root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ fclose(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* When using an existing key item, the root key is optional. */
+ if (!key_item && (!root_key || !RSA_get0_d(root_key))) {
+ pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n",
+ root_key_file);
+ pr_info("Try 'openssl genrsa -out root_key.pem'\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The certificate/firmware private key is always required. */
+ fp = fopen(fw_key_file, "rb");
+ if (fp) {
+ fw_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ fclose(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
+ }
+ if (!fw_key) {
+ /* If the root key is a private key, it can be used instead. */
+ if (root_key && RSA_get0_d(root_key)) {
+ pr_info("Using root key as firmware key\n");
+ fw_key = root_key;
+ } else {
+ pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n",
+ fw_key_file);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Warn about potential compatibility issues. */
+ if (key_item || fw_key != root_key)
+ pr_warn("Only H6 supports separate root and firmware keys\n");
+
+ ret = toc0_create(buf, params->file_size, root_key, fw_key,
+ key_item, key_item_len,
+ buf + TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN,
+ params->orig_file_size, params->addr);
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(key_item);
+ OPENSSL_free(root_key);
+ if (fw_key != root_key)
+ OPENSSL_free(fw_key);
+ if (fp)
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ if (ret != EXIT_SUCCESS)
+ exit(ret);
+}
+
+static int toc0_check_image_type(uint8_t type)
+{
+ return type == IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0 ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+static int toc0_vrec_header(struct image_tool_params *params,
+ struct image_type_params *tparams)
+{
+ tparams->hdr = calloc(tparams->header_size, 1);
+
+ /* Save off the unpadded data size for SHA256 calculation. */
+ params->orig_file_size = params->file_size - TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN;
+
+ /* Return padding to 8K blocks. */
+ return ALIGN(params->file_size, PAD_SIZE) - params->file_size;
+}
+
+U_BOOT_IMAGE_TYPE(
+ sunxi_toc0,
+ "Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image support",
+ TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN,
+ NULL,
+ toc0_check_params,
+ toc0_verify_header,
+ toc0_print_header,
+ toc0_set_header,
+ NULL,
+ toc0_check_image_type,
+ NULL,
+ toc0_vrec_header
+);
projects / uboot.git / commitdiff