]> git.baikalelectronics.ru Git - kernel.git/commitdiff
bpf: Fix to preserve reg parent/live fields when copying range info
authorEduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Fri, 6 Jan 2023 14:22:13 +0000 (16:22 +0200)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 9 Feb 2023 10:28:01 +0000 (11:28 +0100)
[ Upstream commit 71f656a50176915d6813751188b5758daa8d012b ]

Register range information is copied in several places. The intent is
to transfer range/id information from one register/stack spill to
another. Currently this is done using direct register assignment, e.g.:

static void find_equal_scalars(..., struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg)
{
...
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
...
*reg = *known_reg;
...
}

However, such assignments also copy the following bpf_reg_state fields:

struct bpf_reg_state {
...
struct bpf_reg_state *parent;
...
enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
...
};

Copying of these fields is accidental and incorrect, as could be
demonstrated by the following example:

     0: call ktime_get_ns()
     1: r6 = r0
     2: call ktime_get_ns()
     3: r7 = r0
     4: if r0 > r6 goto +1             ; r0 & r6 are unbound thus generated
                                       ; branch states are identical
     5: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0xdeadbeef ; 64-bit write to fp[-8]
    --- checkpoint ---
     6: r1 = 42                        ; r1 marked as written
     7: *(u8 *)(r10 - 8) = r1          ; 8-bit write, fp[-8] parent & live
                                       ; overwritten
     8: r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8)
     9: r0 = 0
    10: exit

This example is unsafe because 64-bit write to fp[-8] at (5) is
conditional, thus not all bytes of fp[-8] are guaranteed to be set
when it is read at (8). However, currently the example passes
verification.

First, the execution path 1-10 is examined by verifier.
Suppose that a new checkpoint is created by is_state_visited() at (6).
After checkpoint creation:
- r1.parent points to checkpoint.r1,
- fp[-8].parent points to checkpoint.fp[-8].
At (6) the r1.live is set to REG_LIVE_WRITTEN.
At (7) the fp[-8].parent is set to r1.parent and fp[-8].live is set to
REG_LIVE_WRITTEN, because of the following code called in
check_stack_write_fixed_off():

static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int size)
{
...
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg;  // <--- parent & live copied
if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
...
}

Note the intent to mark stack spill as written only if 8 bytes are
spilled to a slot, however this intent is spoiled by a 'live' field copy.
At (8) the checkpoint.fp[-8] should be marked as REG_LIVE_READ but
this does not happen:
- fp[-8] in a current state is already marked as REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
- fp[-8].parent points to checkpoint.r1, parentage chain is used by
  mark_reg_read() to mark checkpoint states.
At (10) the verification is finished for path 1-10 and jump 4-6 is
examined. The checkpoint.fp[-8] never gets REG_LIVE_READ mark and this
spill is pruned from the cached states by clean_live_states(). Hence
verifier state obtained via path 1-4,6 is deemed identical to one
obtained via path 1-6 and program marked as safe.

Note: the example should be executed with BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ flag
set to force creation of intermediate verifier states.

This commit revisits the locations where bpf_reg_state instances are
copied and replaces the direct copies with a call to a function
copy_register_state(dst, src) that preserves 'parent' and 'live'
fields of the 'dst'.

Fixes: c4370e2d8695 ("bpf/verifier: per-register parent pointers")
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230106142214.1040390-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kernel/bpf/verifier.c

index 398a0008aff724945dd61a2cbc062e692add9542..82f2da71eb35d7c93ff8d4fccc7c8abeefd4029a 100644 (file)
@@ -3011,13 +3011,24 @@ static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
        return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
 }
 
+/* Copy src state preserving dst->parent and dst->live fields */
+static void copy_register_state(struct bpf_reg_state *dst, const struct bpf_reg_state *src)
+{
+       struct bpf_reg_state *parent = dst->parent;
+       enum bpf_reg_liveness live = dst->live;
+
+       *dst = *src;
+       dst->parent = parent;
+       dst->live = live;
+}
+
 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
                                int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
                                int size)
 {
        int i;
 
-       state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg;
+       copy_register_state(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, reg);
        if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
                state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
 
@@ -3345,7 +3356,7 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
                                 */
                                s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def;
 
-                               state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg;
+                               copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg);
                                state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def;
                        } else {
                                for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
@@ -3366,7 +3377,7 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
                if (dst_regno >= 0) {
                        /* restore register state from stack */
-                       state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg;
+                       copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg);
                        /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely
                         * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited()
                         * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
@@ -8085,7 +8096,7 @@ do_sim:
         */
        if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) {
                tmp = *dst_reg;
-               *dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
+               copy_register_state(dst_reg, ptr_reg);
        }
        ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1,
                                        env->insn_idx);
@@ -9338,7 +9349,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
                                         * to propagate min/max range.
                                         */
                                        src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
-                               *dst_reg = *src_reg;
+                               copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
                                dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
                                dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
                        } else {
@@ -9349,7 +9360,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
                                                insn->src_reg);
                                        return -EACCES;
                                } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
-                                       *dst_reg = *src_reg;
+                                       copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
                                        /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise
                                         * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly
                                         * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars()
@@ -10145,7 +10156,7 @@ static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
 
        bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({
                if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id)
-                       *reg = *known_reg;
+                       copy_register_state(reg, known_reg);
        }));
 }