syzbot reported an illegal copy_to_user() attempt
from bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd() [1]
There was no repro yet on this bug, but I think
that commit
8c5276ad8b23 ("mm/usercopy: Detect vmalloc overruns")
is exposing a prior bug in bpf arm64.
bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd() looks at prog->jited_len
to determine if the JIT image can be copied out to user space.
My theory is that syzbot managed to get a prog where prog->jited_len
has been set to 43, while prog->bpf_func has ben cleared.
It is not clear why copy_to_user(uinsns, NULL, ulen) is triggering
this particular warning.
I thought find_vma_area(NULL) would not find a vm_struct.
As we do not hold vmap_area_lock spinlock, it might be possible
that the found vm_struct was garbage.
[1]
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
792633534417210172, size 43)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 25002 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted
5.18.0-syzkaller-10139-g8291eaafed36 #0
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate:
60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:101
lr : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89
sp :
ffff80000b773a20
x29:
ffff80000b773a30 x28:
faff80000b745000 x27:
ffff80000b773b48
x26:
0000000000000000 x25:
000000000000002b x24:
0000000000000000
x23:
00000000000000e0 x22:
ffff80000b75db67 x21:
0000000000000001
x20:
000000000000002b x19:
ffff80000b75db3c x18:
00000000fffffffd
x17:
2820636f6c6c616d x16:
76206d6f72662064 x15:
6574636574656420
x14:
74706d6574746120 x13:
2129333420657a69 x12:
73202c3237313031
x11:
3237313434333533 x10:
3336323937207465 x9 :
657275736f707865
x8 :
ffff80000a30c550 x7 :
ffff80000b773830 x6 :
ffff80000b773830
x5 :
0000000000000000 x4 :
ffff00007fbbaa10 x3 :
0000000000000000
x2 :
0000000000000000 x1 :
f7ff000028fc0000 x0 :
0000000000000064
Call trace:
usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89
check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:186 [inline]
__check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:252 [inline]
__check_object_size+0x198/0x36c mm/usercopy.c:214
check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:199 [inline]
check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:235 [inline]
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:159 [inline]
bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd.isra.0+0xf14/0xfdc kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3993
bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd+0x12c/0x510 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4253
__sys_bpf+0x900/0x2150 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4956
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5021 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019 [inline]
__arm64_sys_bpf+0x28/0x40 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
do_el0_svc+0xa0/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206
el0_svc+0x44/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:624
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:642
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581
Code:
aa0003e3 d00038c0 91248000 97fff65f (
d4210000)
Fixes: 8e41f049c42c ("bpf: arm64: add JIT support for multi-function programs")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220531215113.1100754-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>