blk-cgroup: fix UAF by grabbing blkcg lock before destroying blkg pd

blk-cgroup: fix UAF by grabbing blkcg lock before destroying blkg pd

KASAN reports a use-after-free report when doing fuzz test:

[693354.104835] ==================================================================
[693354.105094] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bfq_io_set_weight_legacy+0xd3/0x160
[693354.105336] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888be0a35664 by task sh/1453338

[693354.105607] CPU: 41 PID: 1453338 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.18.0-147
[693354.105610] Hardware name: Huawei 2288H V5/BC11SPSCB0, BIOS 0.81 07/02/2018
[693354.105612] Call Trace:
[693354.105621]  dump_stack+0xf1/0x19b
[693354.105626]  ? show_regs_print_info+0x5/0x5
[693354.105634]  ? printk+0x9c/0xc3
[693354.105638]  ? cpumask_weight+0x1f/0x1f
[693354.105648]  print_address_description+0x70/0x360
[693354.105654]  kasan_report+0x1b2/0x330
[693354.105659]  ? bfq_io_set_weight_legacy+0xd3/0x160
[693354.105665]  ? bfq_io_set_weight_legacy+0xd3/0x160
[693354.105670]  bfq_io_set_weight_legacy+0xd3/0x160
[693354.105675]  ? bfq_cpd_init+0x20/0x20
[693354.105683]  cgroup_file_write+0x3aa/0x510
[693354.105693]  ? ___slab_alloc+0x507/0x540
[693354.105698]  ? cgroup_file_poll+0x60/0x60
[693354.105702]  ? 0xffffffff89600000
[693354.105708]  ? usercopy_abort+0x90/0x90
[693354.105716]  ? mutex_lock+0xef/0x180
[693354.105726]  kernfs_fop_write+0x1ab/0x280
[693354.105732]  ? cgroup_file_poll+0x60/0x60
[693354.105738]  vfs_write+0xe7/0x230
[693354.105744]  ksys_write+0xb0/0x140
[693354.105749]  ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50
[693354.105760]  do_syscall_64+0x112/0x370
[693354.105766]  ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x260/0x260
[693354.105772]  ? do_page_fault+0x9b/0x270
[693354.105779]  ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0xf9/0x1a0
[693354.105784]  ? enter_from_user_mode+0x30/0x30
[693354.105793]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca

[693354.105875] Allocated by task 1453337:
[693354.106001]  kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
[693354.106006]  kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x108/0x220
[693354.106010]  bfq_pd_alloc+0x96/0x120
[693354.106015]  blkcg_activate_policy+0x1b7/0x2b0
[693354.106020]  bfq_create_group_hierarchy+0x1e/0x80
[693354.106026]  bfq_init_queue+0x678/0x8c0
[693354.106031]  blk_mq_init_sched+0x1f8/0x460
[693354.106037]  elevator_switch_mq+0xe1/0x240
[693354.106041]  elevator_switch+0x25/0x40
[693354.106045]  elv_iosched_store+0x1a1/0x230
[693354.106049]  queue_attr_store+0x78/0xb0
[693354.106053]  kernfs_fop_write+0x1ab/0x280
[693354.106056]  vfs_write+0xe7/0x230
[693354.106060]  ksys_write+0xb0/0x140
[693354.106064]  do_syscall_64+0x112/0x370
[693354.106069]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca

[693354.106114] Freed by task 1453336:
[693354.106225]  __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180
[693354.106229]  kfree+0x90/0x1b0
[693354.106233]  blkcg_deactivate_policy+0x12c/0x220
[693354.106238]  bfq_exit_queue+0xf5/0x110
[693354.106241]  blk_mq_exit_sched+0x104/0x130
[693354.106245]  __elevator_exit+0x45/0x60
[693354.106249]  elevator_switch_mq+0xd6/0x240
[693354.106253]  elevator_switch+0x25/0x40
[693354.106257]  elv_iosched_store+0x1a1/0x230
[693354.106261]  queue_attr_store+0x78/0xb0
[693354.106264]  kernfs_fop_write+0x1ab/0x280
[693354.106268]  vfs_write+0xe7/0x230
[693354.106271]  ksys_write+0xb0/0x140
[693354.106275]  do_syscall_64+0x112/0x370
[693354.106280]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca

[693354.106329] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888be0a35580
                 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
[693354.106736] The buggy address is located 228 bytes inside of
                 1024-byte region [ffff888be0a35580, ffff888be0a35980)
[693354.107114] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[693354.107273] page:ffffea002f828c00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff888107c17080 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[693354.107606] flags: 0x17ffffc0008100(slab|head)
[693354.107760] raw: 0017ffffc0008100 ffffea002fcbc808 ffffea0030bd3a08 ffff888107c17080
[693354.108020] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000001c001c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[693354.108278] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[693354.108511] Memory state around the buggy address:
[693354.108671]  ffff888be0a35500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[693354.116396]  ffff888be0a35580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[693354.124473] >ffff888be0a35600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[693354.132421]                                                        ^
[693354.140284]  ffff888be0a35680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[693354.147912]  ffff888be0a35700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[693354.155281] ==================================================================

blkgs are protected by both queue and blkcg locks and holding
either should stabilize them. However, the path of destroying
blkg policy data is only protected by queue lock in
blkcg_activate_policy()/blkcg_deactivate_policy(). Other tasks
can get the blkg policy data before the blkg policy data is
destroyed, and use it after destroyed, which will result in a
use-after-free.

CPU0                             CPU1
blkcg_deactivate_policy
  spin_lock_irq(&q->queue_lock)
                                 bfq_io_set_weight_legacy
                                   spin_lock_irq(&blkcg->lock)
                                   blkg_to_bfqg(blkg)
                                     pd_to_bfqg(blkg->pd[pol->plid])
                                     ^^^^^^blkg->pd[pol->plid] != NULL
                                           bfqg != NULL
  pol->pd_free_fn(blkg->pd[pol->plid])
    pd_to_bfqg(blkg->pd[pol->plid])
    bfqg_put(bfqg)
      kfree(bfqg)
  blkg->pd[pol->plid] = NULL
  spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
                                   bfq_group_set_weight(bfqg, val, 0)
                                     bfqg->entity.new_weight
                                     ^^^^^^trigger uaf here
                                   spin_unlock_irq(&blkcg->lock);

Fix by grabbing the matching blkcg lock before trying to
destroy blkg policy data.

Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Li Jinlin <lijinlin3@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210914042605.3260596-1-lijinlin3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>