]> git.baikalelectronics.ru Git - kernel.git/commit
aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
authorJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Thu, 15 Sep 2016 22:31:22 +0000 (00:31 +0200)
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Thu, 15 Sep 2016 22:49:28 +0000 (15:49 -0700)
commit715ae43881faef3844de5eeb301006724b6a522c
treee862a0c7bb66ba58b3ad3298efe066793c14a234
parentbb39102e7d4f43b2b2f134a3e1a95aed4ed70884
aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec

This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set.  Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.

I have tested the patch on my machine.

To test the behavior, compile and run this:

    #define _GNU_SOURCE
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <sys/personality.h>
    #include <linux/aio_abi.h>
    #include <err.h>
    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <sys/syscall.h>

    int main(void) {
        personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
        aio_context_t ctx = 0;
        if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
            err(1, "io_setup");

        char cmd[1000];
        sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
            (int)getpid());
        system(cmd);
        return 0;
    }

In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
fs/aio.c