Revert "KVM: nVMX: Do not expose MPX VMX controls when guest MPX disabled"
Since commit
0ac421831741 ("KVM: nVMX: Do not expose MPX VMX controls
when guest MPX disabled"), KVM has taken ownership of the "load
IA32_BNDCFGS" and "clear IA32_BNDCFGS" VMX entry/exit controls,
trying to set these bits in the IA32_VMX_TRUE_{ENTRY,EXIT}_CTLS
MSRs if the guest's CPUID supports MPX, and clear otherwise.
The intent of the patch was to apply it to L0 in order to work around
L1 kernels that lack the fix in commit
03285973c03b ("kvm: vmx: allow
host to access guest MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS", 2017-07-04): by hiding the
control bits from L0, L1 hides BNDCFGS from KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST,
and the L1 bug is neutralized even in the lack of commit
03285973c03b.
This was perhaps a sensible kludge at the time, but a horrible
idea in the long term and in fact it has not been extended to
other CPUID bits like these:
X86_FEATURE_LM => VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE,
VMX_MISC_SAVE_EFER_LMA
X86_FEATURE_TSC => CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING,
SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING
X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE => SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID
X86_FEATURE_MWAIT => CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING, CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING
X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT => SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX, SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA,
VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL
X86_FEATURE_XSAVES => SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES
These days it's sort of common knowledge that any MSR in
KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST must allow *at least* setting it with KVM_SET_MSR
to a default value, so it is unlikely that something like commit
0ac421831741 will be needed again. So revert it, at the potential cost
of breaking L1s with a 6 year old kernel. While in principle the L0 owner
doesn't control what runs on L1, such an old hypervisor would probably
have many other bugs.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>