rxrpc: Fix several cases where a padded len isn't checked in ticket decode
This fixes CVE-2017-7482.
When a kerberos 5 ticket is being decoded so that it can be loaded into an
rxrpc-type key, there are several places in which the length of a
variable-length field is checked to make sure that it's not going to
overrun the available data - but the data is padded to the nearest
four-byte boundary and the code doesn't check for this extra. This could
lead to the size-remaining variable wrapping and the data pointer going
over the end of the buffer.
Fix this by making the various variable-length data checks use the padded
length.
Reported-by: 石磊 <shilei-c@360.cn> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@auristor.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>