If the allocation of multiple MSI vectors for multi-MSI fails in the core
PCI framework, the framework will retry the allocation as a single MSI
vector, assuming that meets the min_vecs specified by the requesting
driver.
Hyper-V advertises that multi-MSI is supported, but reuses the VECTOR
domain to implement that for x86. The VECTOR domain does not support
multi-MSI, so the alloc will always fail and fallback to a single MSI
allocation.
In short, Hyper-V advertises a capability it does not implement.
Hyper-V can support multi-MSI because it coordinates with the hypervisor
to map the MSIs in the IOMMU's interrupt remapper, which is something the
VECTOR domain does not have. Therefore the fix is simple - copy what the
x86 IOMMU drivers (AMD/Intel-IR) do by removing
X86_IRQ_ALLOC_CONTIGUOUS_VECTORS after calling the VECTOR domain's
pci_msi_prepare().
5.15 backport - adds the hv_msi_prepare wrapper function
Fixes: e794bca1a470 ("PCI: hv: Add paravirtual PCI front-end for Microsoft Hyper-V VMs") Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1649856981-14649-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip <quic_carlv@quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The upstream commit 647e4b92e765 ("selftest/vm: verify mmap addr in
mremap_test") was backported as commit 122a06831484 ("selftest/vm:
verify mmap addr in mremap_test"). Repeated backport introduced the
duplicate of function get_mmap_min_addr to the file breakign the vm
selftest build.
The upstream commit b952f38bf3e2 ("selftest/vm: verify remap destination
address in mremap_test") was backported as commit 173b9fc99974
("selftest/vm: verify remap destination address in mremap_test").
Repeated backport introduced the duplicate of function
is_remap_region_valid to the file breakign the vm selftest build.
I've stumbled over this while reviewing patches for DMA-buf and it looks
like we completely messed the locking up here.
In general most TTM function should only be called while holding the
appropriate BO resv lock. Without this we could break the internal
buffer object state here.
Only compile tested!
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Fixes: 22f109eb6e34 ("drm/ttm: Add vmap/vunmap to TTM and TTM GEM helpers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220715111533.467012-1-christian.koenig@amd.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot.
This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be
enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features
is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be
enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through
securityfs.
If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param,
lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is
disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from
the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover
cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot.
To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to
the kernel command line; then:
mlxsw needs to distinguish nexthops with a gateway from connected
nexthops in order to write the former to the adjacency table of the
device. The check used to rely on the fact that nexthops with a gateway
have a 'link' scope whereas connected nexthops have a 'host' scope. This
is no longer correct after commit 7c0d80225cc9 ("ip: fix dflt addr
selection for connected nexthop").
Fix that by instead checking the address family of the gateway IP. This
is a more direct way and also consistent with the IPv6 counterpart in
mlxsw_sp_rt6_is_gateway().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7c0d80225cc9 ("ip: fix dflt addr selection for connected nexthop") Fixes: 0b2837f003c1 ("nexthop: Add support for IPv4 nexthops") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When trying to load modules built for RISC-V which include assembly files
the kernel loader errors with "unexpected relocation type 'R_RISCV_ALIGN'"
due to R_RISCV_ALIGN relocations being generated by the assembler.
The R_RISCV_ALIGN relocations can be removed at the expense of code space
by adding -mno-relax to gcc and as. In commit 22c906a874399f5
("RISC-V: Fixes to module loading") -mno-relax is added to the build
variable KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE. See [1] for more info.
The issue is that when kbuild builds a .S file, it invokes gcc with
the -mno-relax flag, but this is not being passed through to the
assembler. Adding -Wa,-mno-relax to KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE ensures that
the assembler is invoked correctly. This may have now been fixed in
gcc[2] and this addition should not stop newer gcc and as from working.
To act as an interrupt controller, a gpio bank relies on the
"interrupt-parent" of the pin controller.
When this optional "interrupt-parent" misses, do not create any IRQ domain.
This fixes a "NULL pointer in stm32_gpio_domain_alloc()" kernel crash when
the interrupt-parent = <exti> property is not declared in the Device Tree.
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQM40VmiLTkPND2@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
$
Just silences this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQTm9wsB3hxQWvy@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Instead of doing complicated calculations to find the size of the subroutines
(which are even more complicated because they need to be stringified into
an asm statement), just hardcode to 16.
It is less dense for a few combinations of IBT/SLS/retbleed, but it has
the advantage of being really simple.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15.x: 8db6b1bc7390: x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The return thunk call makes the fastop functions larger, just like IBT
does. Consider a 16-byte FASTOP_SIZE when CONFIG_RETHUNK is enabled.
Otherwise, functions will be incorrectly aligned and when computing their
position for differently sized operators, they will executed in the middle
or end of a function, which may as well be an int3, leading to a crash
like:
Ben Hutchings [Wed, 13 Jul 2022 22:39:33 +0000 (00:39 +0200)]
x86/xen: Fix initialisation in hypercall_page after rethunk
The hypercall_page is special and the RETs there should not be changed
into rethunk calls (but can have SLS mitigation). Change the initial
instructions to ret + int3 padding, as was done in upstream commit f80e8ecf1119 "x86/ibt,xen: Sprinkle the ENDBR".
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
__static_call_fixup() invokes __static_call_transform() without holding
text_mutex, which causes lockdep to complain in text_poke_bp().
Adding the proper locking cures that, but as this is either used during
early boot or during module finalizing, it's not required to use
text_poke_bp(). Add an argument to __static_call_transform() which tells
it to use text_poke_early() for it.
Fixes: 9bd2b3a6b6f0 ("x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on
RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History
Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI.
Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines,
eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against
such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may
fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target
may get influenced by branch history.
A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback
behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions
from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for
this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2).
For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that
protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set
RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There are some VM configurations which have Skylake model but do not
support IBPB. In those cases, when using retbleed=ibpb, userspace is going
to be killed and kernel is going to panic.
If the CPU does not support IBPB, warn and proceed with the auto option. Also,
do not fallback to IBPB on AMD/Hygon systems if it is not supported.
Fixes: bf9a7f6cdeaa ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
had to change that because the 'ret' was too early and moved it into
idtentry, bloating the text size, since idtentry is expanded for every
exception vector.
However, with the advent of xen_error_entry() in commit
it became possible to remove PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS from idtentry, back
into *error_entry().
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: error_entry still does cld] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts.
NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will
silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: there is no CONFIG_OBJTOOL]
[cascardo: objtool calling and option parsing has changed] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion.
Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC.
Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate
given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_BRS]
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_CPPC] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a
bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal
knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Convert __vmx_vcpu_run()'s 'launched' argument to 'flags', in
preparation for doing SPEC_CTRL handling immediately after vmexit, which
will need another flag.
This is much easier than adding a fourth argument, because this code
supports both 32-bit and 64-bit, and the fourth argument on 32-bit would
have to be pushed on the stack.
Note that __vmx_vcpu_run_flags() is called outside of the noinstr
critical section because it will soon start calling potentially
traceable functions.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This mask has been made redundant by kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(). And it
doesn't even work when MSR interception is disabled, as the guest can
just write to SPEC_CTRL directly.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants
to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be
silently disabled.
There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling. Remove the
CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Zen2 uarchs have an undocumented, unnamed, MSR that contains a chicken
bit for some speculation behaviour. It needs setting.
Note: very belatedly AMD released naming; it's now officially called
MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2 and MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2_SUPPRESS_NOBR_PRED_BIT
but shall remain the SPECTRAL CHICKEN.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Since entry asm is tricky, add a validation pass that ensures the
retbleed mitigation has been done before the first actual RET
instruction.
Entry points are those that either have UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY, which acts
as UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY but marks the instruction as an entry point, or
those that have UWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS at +0.
This is basically a variant of validate_branch() that is
intra-function and it will simply follow all branches from marked
entry points and ensures that all paths lead to ANNOTATE_UNRET_END.
If a path hits RET or an indirection the path is a fail and will be
reported.
There are 3 ANNOTATE_UNRET_END instances:
- UNTRAIN_RET itself
- exception from-kernel; this path doesn't need UNTRAIN_RET
- all early exceptions; these also don't need UNTRAIN_RET
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: tools/objtool/builtin-check.c no link option validation]
[cascardo: tools/objtool/check.c opts.ibt is ibt]
[cascardo: tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h leave unret option as bool, no struct opts]
[cascardo: objtool is still called from scripts/link-vmlinux.sh]
[cascardo: no IBT support] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When booting with retbleed=auto, if the kernel wasn't built with
CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK, the mitigation falls back to IBPB. Make
sure a warning is printed in that case. The IBPB fallback check is done
twice, but it really only needs to be done once.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jmp2ret mitigates the easy-to-attack case at relatively low overhead.
It mitigates the long speculation windows after a mispredicted RET, but
it does not mitigate the short speculation window from arbitrary
instruction boundaries.
On Zen2, there is a chicken bit which needs setting, which mitigates
"arbitrary instruction boundaries" down to just "basic block boundaries".
But there is no fix for the short speculation window on basic block
boundaries, other than to flush the entire BTB to evict all attacker
predictions.
On the spectrum of "fast & blurry" -> "safe", there is (on top of STIBP
or no-SMT):
1) Nothing System wide open
2) jmp2ret May stop a script kiddy
3) jmp2ret+chickenbit Raises the bar rather further
4) IBPB Only thing which can count as "safe".
Tentative numbers put IBPB-on-entry at a 2.5x hit on Zen2, and a 10x hit
on Zen1 according to lmbench.
Having IBRS enabled while the SMT sibling is idle unnecessarily slows
down the running sibling. OTOH, disabling IBRS around idle takes two
MSR writes, which will increase the idle latency.
Therefore, only disable IBRS around deeper idle states. Shallow idle
states are bounded by the tick in duration, since NOHZ is not allowed
for them by virtue of their short target residency.
Only do this for mwait-driven idle, since that keeps interrupts disabled
across idle, which makes disabling IBRS vs IRQ-entry a non-issue.
Note: C6 is a random threshold, most importantly C1 probably shouldn't
disable IBRS, benchmarking needed.
Suggested-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no CPUIDLE_FLAG_IRQ_ENABLE] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB
underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware.
Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than
UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET
itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means
IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET.
Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S]
[cascardo: conflict fixups, no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Due to TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB the actual IA32_SPEC_CTRL value can
differ from x86_spec_ctrl_base. As such, keep a per-CPU value
reflecting the current task's MSR content.
[jpoimboe: rename]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add the "retbleed=<value>" boot parameter to select a mitigation for
RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret"
(JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto".
Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on
AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on
Intel).
Note: needs to be in a section distinct from Retpolines such that the
Retpoline RET substitution cannot possibly use immediate jumps.
ORC unwinding for zen_untrain_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() is a
little tricky but works due to the fact that zen_untrain_ret() doesn't
have any stack ops and as such will emit a single ORC entry at the
start (+0x3f).
Meanwhile, unwinding an IP, including the __x86_return_thunk() one
(+0x40) will search for the largest ORC entry smaller or equal to the
IP, these will find the one ORC entry (+0x3f) and all works.
0696ce348f2a ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()")
manages to introduce a CALL/RET pair that is before SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3,
which means it is before RETBleed can be mitigated.
Revert to an earlier version of the commit in Fixes. Down side is that
this will bloat .text size somewhat. The alternative is fully reverting
it.
The purpose of this patch was to allow migrating error_entry() to C,
including the whole of kPTI. Much care needs to be taken moving that
forward to not re-introduce this problem of early RETs.
Fixes: 0696ce348f2a ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Use the return thunk in asm code. If the thunk isn't needed, it will
get patched into a RET instruction during boot by apply_returns().
Since alternatives can't handle relocations outside of the first
instruction, putting a 'jmp __x86_return_thunk' in one is not valid,
therefore carve out the memmove ERMS path into a separate label and jump
to it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Specifically, it's because __enc_copy() encrypts the kernel after
being relocated outside the kernel in sme_encrypt_execute(), and the
RET macro's jmp offset isn't amended prior to execution.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Prepare the SETcc fastop stuff for when RET can be larger still.
The tricky bit here is that the expressions should not only be
constant C expressions, but also absolute GAS expressions. This means
no ?: and 'true' is ~0.
Also ensure em_setcc() has the same alignment as the actual FOP_SETCC()
ops, this ensures there cannot be an alignment hole between em_setcc()
and the first op.
Additionally, add a .skip directive to the FOP_SETCC() macro to fill
any remaining space with INT3 traps; however the primary purpose of
this directive is to generate AS warnings when the remaining space
goes negative. Which is a very good indication the alignment magic
went side-ways.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: ignore ENDBR when computing SETCC_LENGTH]
[cascardo: conflict fixup] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Use the return thunk in ftrace trampolines, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: still copy return from ftrace_stub]
[cascardo: use memcpy(text_gen_insn) as there is no __text_gen_insn] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In addition to teaching static_call about the new way to spell 'RET',
there is an added complication in that static_call() is allowed to
rewrite text before it is known which particular spelling is required.
In order to deal with this; have a static_call specific fixup in the
apply_return() 'alternative' patching routine that will rewrite the
static_call trampoline to match the definite sequence.
This in turn creates the problem of uniquely identifying static call
trampolines. Currently trampolines are 8 bytes, the first 5 being the
jmp.d32/ret sequence and the final 3 a byte sequence that spells out
'SCT'.
This sequence is used in __static_call_validate() to ensure it is
patching a trampoline and not a random other jmp.d32. That is,
false-positives shouldn't be plenty, but aren't a big concern.
OTOH the new __static_call_fixup() must not have false-positives, and
'SCT' decodes to the somewhat weird but semi plausible sequence:
push %rbx
rex.XB push %r12
Additionally, there are SLS concerns with immediate jumps. Combined it
seems like a good moment to change the signature to a single 3 byte
trap instruction that is unique to this usage and will not ever get
generated by accident.
As such, change the signature to: '0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc', which decodes
to:
ud1 %esp, %ecx
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: skip validation as introduced by f2ed2b8d59e6 ("static_call,x86: Robustify trampoline patching")] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites
The .discard.text section is added in order to reserve BRK, with a
temporary function just so it can give it a size. This adds a relocation to
the return thunk, which objtool will add to the .return_sites section.
Linking will then fail as there are references to the .discard.text
section.
Do not add instructions from non-text sections to the list of return thunk
calls, avoiding the reference to .discard.text.
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Utilize -mfunction-return=thunk-extern when available to have the
compiler replace RET instructions with direct JMPs to the symbol
__x86_return_thunk. This does not affect assembler (.S) sources, only C
sources.
-mfunction-return=thunk-extern has been available since gcc 7.3 and
clang 15.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: RETPOLINE_CFLAGS is at Makefile]
[cascardo: remove ANNOTATE_NOENDBR from __x86_return_thunk] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Put the actual retpoline thunk as the original code so that it can
become more complicated. Specifically, it allows RET to be a JMP,
which can't be .altinstr_replacement since that doesn't do relocations
(except for the very first instruction).
Commit e631695e6304 ("x86/ibt: Base IBT bits") added this option when
building realmode in order to disable IBT there. This is also needed in
order to disable return thunks.
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Yes, r11 and rcx have been restored previously, but since they're being
popped anyway (into rsi) might as well pop them into their own regs --
setting them to the value they already are.
Less magical code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506121631.365070674@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Current BPF codegen doesn't respect X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE* flags and
unconditionally emits a thunk call, this is sub-optimal and doesn't
match the regular, compiler generated, code.
Update the i386 JIT to emit code equal to what the compiler emits for
the regular kernel text (IOW. a plain THUNK call).
Update the x86_64 JIT to emit code similar to the result of compiler
and kernel rewrites as according to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE* flags.
Inlining RETPOLINE_AMD (lfence; jmp *%reg) and !RETPOLINE (jmp *%reg),
while doing a THUNK call for RETPOLINE.
This removes the hard-coded retpoline thunks and shrinks the generated
code. Leaving a single retpoline thunk definition in the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.614772675@infradead.org
[cascardo: RETPOLINE_AMD was renamed to RETPOLINE_LFENCE] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Take an idea from the 32bit JIT, which uses the multi-pass nature of
the JIT to compute the instruction offsets on a prior pass in order to
compute the relative jump offsets on a later pass.
Application to the x86_64 JIT is slightly more involved because the
offsets depend on program variables (such as callee_regs_used and
stack_depth) and hence the computed offsets need to be kept in the
context of the JIT.
This removes, IMO quite fragile, code that hard-codes the offsets and
tries to compute the length of variable parts of it.
Convert both emit_bpf_tail_call_*() functions which have an out: label
at the end. Additionally emit_bpt_tail_call_direct() also has a poke
table entry, for which it computes the offset from the end (and thus
already relies on the previous pass to have computed addrs[i]), also
convert this to be a forward based offset.
Specifically, the sequence above is 5 bytes for the low 8 registers,
but 6 bytes for the high 8 registers. This means that unless the
compilers prefix stuff the call with higher registers this replacement
will fail.
Luckily GCC strongly favours RAX for the indirect calls and most (95%+
for defconfig-x86_64) will be converted. OTOH clang strongly favours
R11 and almost nothing gets converted.
Note: it will also generate a correct replacement for the Jcc.d32
case, except unless the compilers start to prefix stuff that, it'll
never fit. Specifically:
Jncc.d8 1f
LFENCE
JMP *%\reg
1:
is 7-8 bytes long, where the original instruction in unpadded form is
only 6 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.359986601@infradead.org
[cascardo: RETPOLINE_AMD was renamed to RETPOLINE_LFENCE] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Stick all the retpolines in a single symbol and have the individual
thunks as inner labels, this should guarantee thunk order and layout.
Previously there were 16 (or rather 15 without rsp) separate symbols and
a toolchain might reasonably expect it could displace them however it
liked, with disregard for their relative position.
However, now they're part of a larger symbol. Any change to their
relative position would disrupt this larger _array symbol and thus not
be sound.
This is the same reasoning used for data symbols. On their own there
is no guarantee about their relative position wrt to one aonther, but
we're still able to do arrays because an array as a whole is a single
larger symbol.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.169659320@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Andi reported that objtool on vmlinux.o consumes more memory than his
system has, leading to horrific performance.
This is in part because we keep a struct instruction for every
instruction in the file in-memory. Shrink struct instruction by
removing the CFI state (which includes full register state) from it
and demand allocating it.
Given most instructions don't actually change CFI state, there's lots
of repetition there, so add a hash table to find previous CFI
instances.
Reduces memory consumption (and runtime) for processing an
x86_64-allyesconfig:
pre: 4:40.84 real, 143.99 user, 44.18 sys, 30624988 mem
post: 2:14.61 real, 108.58 user, 25.04 sys, 16396184 mem
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624095147.756759107@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Instead of writing complete alternatives, simply provide a list of all
the retpoline thunk calls. Then the kernel is free to do with them as
it pleases. Simpler code all-round.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.850007165@infradead.org
[cascardo: fixed conflict because of missing 8dc5c196cc9ad02b13702dc3134124f67d0ee58a] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
XENPV guests enter already on the task stack and they can't fault for
native_iret() nor native_load_gs_index() since they use their own pvop
for IRET and load_gs_index(). A CR3 switch is not needed either.
So there is no reason to call error_entry() in XENPV.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503032107.680190-6-jiangshanlai@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The macro idtentry() (through idtentry_body()) calls error_entry()
unconditionally even on XENPV. But XENPV needs to only push and clear
regs.
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS in error_entry() makes the stack not return to its
original place when the function returns, which means it is not possible
to convert it to a C function.
Carve out PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() and into a separate
function and call it before error_entry() in order to avoid calling
error_entry() on XENPV.
It will also allow for error_entry() to be converted to C code that can
use inlined sync_regs() and save a function call.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503032107.680190-4-jiangshanlai@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
error_entry() calls fixup_bad_iret() before sync_regs() if it is a fault
from a bad IRET, to copy pt_regs to the kernel stack. It switches to the
kernel stack directly after sync_regs().
But error_entry() itself is also a function call, so it has to stash
the address it is going to return to, in %r12 which is unnecessarily
complicated.
Move the stack switching after error_entry() and get rid of the need to
handle the return address.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503032107.680190-3-jiangshanlai@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Always stash the address error_entry() is going to return to, in %r12
and get rid of the void *error_entry_ret; slot in struct bad_iret_stack
which was supposed to account for it and pt_regs pushed on the stack.
After this, both fixup_bad_iret() and sync_regs() can work on a struct
pt_regs pointer directly.
[ bp: Rewrite commit message, touch ups. ]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503032107.680190-2-jiangshanlai@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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