]> git.baikalelectronics.ru Git - kernel.git/commit
exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tue, 12 Nov 2013 23:11:17 +0000 (15:11 -0800)
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Wed, 13 Nov 2013 03:09:33 +0000 (12:09 +0900)
commite14a097f10b2e5f5355a33dd86a75a302f438623
tree7d3b6d88824a0584ae3c8d86782d69bf331d6cef
parenta562d0a4fb4749434307fd0deebd707b2f02e3d9
exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests

The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean.  Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0).  The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state.  Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.

Wrong logic:
    if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }

Correct logic:
    if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }

Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user.  (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)

The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.

CVE-2013-2929

Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
arch/ia64/include/asm/processor.h
fs/exec.c
include/linux/binfmts.h
include/linux/sched.h
kernel/ptrace.c